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 ABSTRACT 
 
This research examined the ability of three-and-four-year-olds to use domains of 
knowledge to evaluate sources of knowledge.  Participants were presented with a 
causal expert who fixed broken toys and a verbal expert who knew the names of tools.  
Participants were then asked if they should ask the causal expert or verbal expert for 
assistance with two questions each concerning causal, verbal, and functional 
knowledge.  Four-year-olds, but not three-year-olds, selected to ask the causal expert 
for causal knowledge and the verbal expert for verbal knowledge.  In terms of 
functional knowledge, as a group participants did not prefer one expert over another.  
However, four-year-olds selected the same expert for both functional questions at a 
significant level, suggesting they had a firm decision about which expert was best 
suited to answer the functional questions.  These results suggest four-year-olds are 
able to use domains of knowledge to evaluate the epistemic states of other people and 
have theories about how verbal, functional, and causal knowledge relate to one 
another. 
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     Introduction 
Children do not raise themselves alone on isolated planets as self-declared 
princes or princesses.  If they do, 20
th
 century French literature suggests children's 
strong drive to socialize compels them to search distant planets for social companions 
(Saint-Exupéry, 1946/1999).  More often, though, young children are raised in 
decidedly social contexts and other people serve as sources of knowledge for children 
to plunder with questions about the world.  As we all know, even with the best of 
intentions sometimes people are uncertain or ignorant (Callanan, Sabbagh, Perez, & 
Cervantes 1995).  Children are therefore obliged to develop a healthy sense of 
skepticism to filter reliable information from misinformation.  In doing so, children's 
cognitive development and social development are intimately threaded together.     
 Recent research has illuminated several important aspects of how young 
children evaluate other people as sources of knowledge.  At sixteen months, young 
children distinguish true from false assertions, attempt to correct people's false 
assertions, and are sensitive to other people's visual access to information (Koenig & 
Echols, 2003).  Three-and-four-year-olds spontaneously keep track of a person's 
history of accuracy and four-year-olds use the history of accuracy to guide subsequent 
learning (Birch, Vauthier, and Bloom, 2008; Clément, Koenig & Harris, 2004).  
Children generally consider adults to be more knowledgeable than children (Taylor, 
Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991), but three-and-four-year-olds prefer to learn from an 
accurate child instead of an adult who has mislabeled familiar objects (Jaswal & 
Neely, 2006).  Additionally, four-year-olds notice when people express certainty or 
uncertainty and they learn better from people who are certain (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 
2001).  Lastly, three-and-four-year-olds consider personal and situational constraints, 
such as people's ability to apply their knowledge to the question at hand, when 
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evaluating whether to trust the information people provide (Kushnir, Wellman, & 
Gelman, 2007).   
 While most of the studies listed above are limited to word learning, there is 
evidence that young children appreciate the significance of having expertise within a 
certain area of knowledge (Danovitch & Keil, F., 2004; Lutz, D. & Keil, F., 2002).  
According to Keil and colleagues (Lutz & Keil, 2002), society reflects the division of 
academic departments in so far as people become experts in areas such as biology and 
mechanics, forming society's “cognitive division of labor.” Supporting this theory, 
four-and-five-year-olds referred to biological and mechanical principles to decide 
whether to ask a doctor or mechanic about various hypothetical questions (Lutz & 
Keil, 2002).  This finding indicates that young children understand both the conceptual 
and social significance of domains of knowledge.  Namely, people's knowledge is 
clustered in conceptually related areas, making them better sources of knowledge 
about topics related to their expertise, but less accurate about conceptually distant 
topics.  However, this research does not indicate whether children can evaluate 
expertise in unfamiliar people by keeping track of a history of accuracy.   
  Thus far, there are a few studies that shed some light on how children may use 
domains of knowledge to evaluate people as sources of knowledge by referring to a 
history of accuracy (Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Sobel & 
Corriveau, in press).  In one of these studies, both three-and-four-year-olds were 
presented with an accurate informant who correctly labeled familiar objects and an 
inaccurate informant who mislabeled those same objects (Koenig & Harris, 2005).  In 
the test trial, both informants presented children with different labels for novel objects 
and functional knowledge concerning how to use novel objects.  Children endorsed the 
accurate informant's labels and functional knowledge.  This result suggests young 
children consider verbal knowledge to be predictive of functional knowledge, at least 
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when faced with accurate and inaccurate labelers.  Since functions are also a sort of 
conventional knowledge, that is, knowledge generally shared by everyone in a society, 
relating verbal and functional knowledge is certainly not unreasonable (Liebal & 
Tomasello, 2009).  Indeed, along with language, functional knowledge forms part of 
what has been termed shared knowledge, meaning that it is part of the “common 
conceptual ground” of society that underlies everyday communication and social 
activity (Liebal & Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2007).  Therefore, 
someone who does not know the conventional labels for familiar objects may be less 
likely to know their normative uses.  However, in the case of this study, it is possible 
that children referred to the experimenters' histories of accuracy, but children may not 
have considered the significance of the two knowledge domains.  That is, children 
may have unwittingly endorsed the accurate informant based on the familiar label 
associations she made without considering how functional knowledge relates to verbal 
knowledge.  Thus, these results are inconclusive for determining how children relate 
verbal knowledge and functional knowledge.    
 The second study addressed how causal knowledge relates to verbal 
knowledge.  Three-and-four-year-olds were presented with someone who knew what 
was inside an object and another person who knew the color of a sticker on the back of 
the object (Sobel & Corriveau, in press).  Thus, both people expressed knowledge of 
the object, but one knew about its internal properties and the other about a superficial 
external property.  Four-year-olds, but not three-year-olds, endorsed the label of the 
person who knew the internal properties.  Since young children associate internal parts 
with causal mechanisms (Gelman & Gottfried, 1996; Gelman & Wellman, 1991), this 
result suggests that four-year-olds consider causal knowledge to be more relevant than 
non-causal knowledge when considering the object's label.  Indeed, someone who 
knows how an object's causal mechanism works demonstrates expertise, whereas 
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knowledge about its appearance indicates mere familiarity.  While familiarity often 
suffices for verbal knowledge, it seems reasonable to expect that the causal expert 
might be a more reliable informant about that particular object's label.  After all, an 
expert may know the entire range of verbal expressions for items in their field of 
expertise, in addition to their causal knowledge.  However, it is not clear that the 
results of this study indicate a general association of causal knowledge and verbal 
knowledge. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that the children's evaluations in 
this study regarded knowledge of that particular type of object's label and were not 
indicative of a general relation between causal knowledge and verbal knowledge.  
Assessing the latter would have required asking children about labels for different 
types of novels objects, not just the objects for which the causal expert knew the 
insides.   
 In sum, these studies suggest that children  may consider domains of 
knowledge (e.g. words, functions, causal properties) when they evaluate how past 
accuracy generalizes to new situations.  To conclusively test this idea, however, we 
need to answer two questions.  The first is whether children can, from a few 
observations, discern expertise of different sorts (e.g. mechanical, verbal, etc.). in 
other words, by keeping track of a history of accuracy?  While it is known that young 
children can identify conceptually related subjects when given a familiar occupational 
label (e.g. a mechanic), it is not known whether children can, from a few observations, 
induce someone's expertise.  Therefore, the second research question concerns 
whether children can use a history of expertise to guide their predictions about which 
questions experts are best suited to answer.   
 We investigated these questions by developing two types of experts, a causal 
expert and a verbal expert.  Three-and-four-year-olds were asked to select the 
appropriate expert for questions concerning three different domains of knowledge.  
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The causal expert demonstrated causal expertise by fixing two broken electronic toys, 
but did not know the names of two tools.  Contrarily, the verbal expert established 
verbal expertise by specifying the names of the two tools, but was unable to fix the 
two broken electronic toys.  To assess whether children keep track of histories of 
expertise, children were asked who fixed the toys and who knew the names of the 
tools.  Children were then asked to help decide which expert's assistance they would 
request to answer questions concerning the labels of novel objects, the functional 
purposes of novel objects, and how to fix additional broken toys.   
 The design therefore evaluates whether young children can keep track of two 
histories of expertise and use them to appropriately guide requests for information.  In 
this case, we hypothesized that four-year-olds would ask for causal information from 
the causal expert and verbal information from the verbal expert, thus expressing 
knowledge of the relevance of knowledge domains.  Doing so would be a strong 
indication that children are sensitive to the difference of these types of knowledge and 
can use verbal and causal information to evaluate people as sources of knowledge.  
We hypothesized that three-year-olds would perform less well in this regard for two 
reasons.  First, past research indicates that three-year-olds have difficulty 
distinguishing different types of knowledge (Lutz & Keil, 2002).  Second, three-year-
olds also have difficulty using information about other people's epistemic states in 
requesting information (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001).  However, three-year-olds are 
able to properly encode information about an informant's history of accuracy, 
suggesting that memory deficiencies  do not underlie the performance differences of 
three and four-year-olds (Clément, Koenig & Harris, 2004).   
 Regarding the second research question, that of whether children can use a 
history of expertise to guide requests for information, it was unclear whether children 
would prefer the verbal expert or the causal expert for the functional prediction 
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questions.  That is, those questions designed to assess who knew the function of the 
toy.  While children considered verbal knowledge to be predictive of functional 
knowledge in prior research (Birch, Vauthier, and Bloom, 2008; Koenig & Harris, 
2005), we sought to assess two different perspectives of how functional knowledge 
relates to causal and verbal knowledge.  According to the theory of shared knowledge 
(Liebal & Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2007), both functional and verbal 
knowledge are types of conventional knowledge shared by everyone in a society.  This 
social aspect of functional knowledge suggests that possessing verbal knowledge 
should be a strong indicator of functional knowledge.  Specifically, if a person is 
familiar with a society's verbal conventions, it is likely that they would also be 
familiar with the functional conventions.  Causal knowledge, however, demonstrates 
expertise in a particular domain, in this case mechanical expertise, which is not a type 
of conventional knowledge widely shared by people.  Thus, from this perspective, 
verbal knowledge should be a better predictor of functional knowledge than causal 
knowledge.   
 From another perspective, the mechanical expertise demonstrated by the causal 
expert is indicative of a strong understanding of how objects work to produce expected 
or desired effects.  Functional knowledge consists of knowing how to manipulate the 
causal structure of an object in order to produce a certain effect.  In this way, 
functional knowledge is indeed related to the causal structure of objects.  Mechanics 
fix objects so that they may be used in the appropriate, normative ways.  Thus, it could 
be argued that despite a lack of verbal knowledge, the causal expert would know more 
than the verbal expert about how novel objects should be used, either from experience 
or by analyzing the structural properties of the objects.  In the current research, a 
forced choice between the verbal expert and the causal expert was implemented to 
analyze how young children conceive of functional knowledge.   
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     Method 
Participants 
 The participants were twenty-six preschoolers, 12 three-year-olds (M= 3.67, 
SD= 0.28) and 14  four-year-olds (M= 4.53, SD= 0.24) from the Ithaca, New York 
region.  Children were recruited at local preschools.  Equal numbers of girls and boys 
participated.  All children spoke English, though some had bilingual backgrounds.  
The sample consisted mostly of children with middle to upper middle class Caucasian 
backgrounds, which is reflective of the surrounding region’s demographics. 
Materials 
 For the warm up trials, photographs of a banana, dog, and hammer were used 
to acclimate children to the testing procedure and experimenter.  Throughout the 
familiarization phase and testing trials, children interacted with two hand puppets, one 
which resembled a monkey and the other a squirrel.  They were aptly referred to as 
“Monkey” and “Squirrel,” respectively.  When Monkey and Squirrel were not 
involved in the interaction, they were positioned below the table.   
 Two electronic toys producing different light and sound effects served as the 
toys for Monkey and Squirrel to fix: an HSM microphone that produced a song and a 
hand-held 20 Questions toy that lit up and produced sounds (see the Appendix for 
photos of the stimuli).  Both toys could be turned off, which enabled the experimenter 
to feign that they were broken.  A standard Phillips screwdriver and wrench served as 
the tools used to “fix” the toys.   
 Various uncommon items were used for the prediction trials.  A green avocado 
peeler and a metal tea diffuser served as unfamiliar tools for the labeling test trial 
questions.  An unconventional dish scrubber and a black electronic box were used as 
the unfamiliar items for the function test trial questions.  Two more hand-held 
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electronic toys were presented as broken toys for the causal test trial questions. 
Design and Procedure 
 Warm Up Trials.  Each child was interviewed at a small table opposite the 
experimenter in a quiet testing room at their preschool.  Three photographs (a hammer, 
dog, and banana) were placed in front of children, one by one.  For each photograph, 
the experimenter asked the child to identify the object.  The experimenter 
congratulated and thanked children for their responses.  All of the children knew the 
names of the depicted items. 
 Familiarization Phase.  After the warm up trials, children were introduced to 
the experimenter's two friends, Monkey and Squirrel, who, children were told, “know 
a lot about stuff.” The experimenter explained that he had some broken toys that 
needed to be fixed, by saying, “Here's the first broken toy.  And here's a tool that 
might help me fix it.” A screwdriver was the first tool and a wrench was the second.  
The experimenter asked the child if they knew what the screwdriver was called.  If 
they did not know, the experimenter told them the name and the child repeated it.   
 Half of the children saw Monkey as the causal expert who fixed the toys; the 
other half saw Squirrel.  Here is an example of a familiarization phase with Monkey as 
the verbal expert and Squirrel as the causal expert.  The experimenter suggested they 
could ask Monkey for help, saying, “Let’s ask Monkey if he can help.  Hey Monkey.  
Can you fix this toy?”  Monkey referred to the screwdriver by name three times as a 
demonstration of his verbal knowledge.  Monkey also tried to fix the toy by inserting 
the screwdriver into the screw holes of the microphone.   The experimenter picked up 
the toy and said to the child, “All right, let's try it.” The experimenter pressed one of 
the buttons a few times, but since the toy was turned off, it did not work.  The 
experimenter lamented, “Oh no! It's still broken.  Thanks, Monkey.”  
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The experimenter then asked Squirrel to help.  Squirrel agreed to try, but was 
ignorant of what the screwdriver was called, saying, “Can I use that thing? I don't 
know what it's called.” Squirrel indicated ignorance of the screwdriver's name three 
times.  Squirrel spent approximately the same amount of time as Monkey fixing the 
toy.  When Squirrel was finished, the experimenter surreptitiously turned on the toy 
and pressed a button, causing it to produce a sound.  The experimenter commented, 
“Hey it works! Thanks, Squirrel.” In this way, Squirrel demonstrated strong causal 
knowledge. 
 The same procedure and pattern of results followed with the second toy and the 
wrench.  Specifically, Monkey knew the tool's name, but was unable to fix the toy.   
Contrarily, Squirrel did not know the tool's name, but was able to use it to fix the toy.  
For each child, the first friend always knew the names of the tools and the second 
friend always properly fixed the toys.  After the familiarization phase, the child was 
presented with the judgment trials and prediction trials.   
 Judgment Trials.  After both of the toys were fixed, the experimenter told the 
child, “I'm so glad my toys are fixed.  I’m going to leave these toys and tools right 
here [the causal expert was placed next to the tools and the label expert next to the 
toys].  Before we do anything else, can you tell me who fixed the toys?” If the child 
did not respond, they were asked if it was Monkey or Squirrel.  The experimenter then 
asked the child who knew the names of the tools.  The order of the two judgment 
questions was counterbalanced, as were the sides on which the toys and tools were 
placed.  Any incorrect responses were appropriately corrected and children were 
congratulated for their responses.  Following the judgment trials, the child was asked 
six predictive questions, two for each type of question: causal, functional, and 
labeling. 
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 Prediction Trials.  The experimenter told the child that he had some more 
things to show her that the experimenter does not know much about.  It was suggested 
that Monkey and Squirrel might know about these things, and that the child could help 
decide which of the friends to ask for help.  Six objects were presented to the child one 
at a time; the order in which they were presented was counterbalanced using a Latin 
square design.  One third of the children were first presented with a function question, 
one third with a label question, and one third with a causal question.  Children were 
shown the novel object and the experimenter told the child whether they wanted to 
know the object's label, what the object is for, or to fix the object.  The experimenter 
then asked which friend they should ask for help.  For example, for a label question, 
the experimenter said, “Now I have this thing [showing the child a tea diffuser or 
avocado peeler].  I don’t know what it is called.  I really want to know what it is 
called.  Which friend should we ask?” If the child did not respond, or said both 
friends, the experimenter repeated the information and the child was asked to choose 
either Squirrel or Monkey.  For the functional questions, the experimenter said they 
needed to know what the object was for, and for the causal questions that they needed 
to fix the object.    
 
     Results 
 
 The proportion of children who correctly answered the judgment questions, 
about 69%, was significant, t(26) = 1.71, p < .05.  This suggests young children can 
keep track of two basic histories of expertise.  Of the eight children (M = 3.9 years; 5 
three-year-olds, 3 four-year-olds) who incorrectly answered the judgment questions, 
seven did not know which informant knew the names of the tools.  Interestingly, all 
but one of these children did not know the names of the tools themselves.  Thus, 
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perhaps these children simply did not comprehend the verbal expert's use of the tool 
names or could not properly evaluate the causal expert's lack of verbal knowledge.  
Unsurprisingly, these children were less likely to ask the verbal expert for labeling 
questions than children who correctly answered the labeling judgment question.    
 In terms of the prediction trials, item analyses via an Analysis of Variance 
revealed that children's responses for the two labeling questions, two function 
questions, and two causal questions did not differ from one another, as no significant 
effects were found.  Thus, the children's responses did not differ based upon any of the 
specific stimuli used for the prediction questions.  We next analyzed whether 
children's responses depended on the order in which the questions were asked, but no 
significant effects were found.  Thus, results were collapsed across condition for 
analysis. 
 Including all of the children, we examined the proportion of children who 
selected the causal expert for the two causal questions, and the verbal expert for the 
two labeling and two functional questions.  An analysis by age revealed that four-year-
olds were significantly more likely than 3 year olds to select the causal expert for the 
causal questions, (df, N = 26)  = 4.08, p < .04, but similar tests for the labeling and 
functional questions were not significant.  Overall, children were more likely to select 
the causal expert for the causal questions, z = 2.40, p < .025, but were not significantly 
more likely to select the verbal expert for functional questions, z = .625, p < .27, or 
labeling questions, z = .875, p < .17.  
 Analyses by age revealed that four-year-olds were more selective in their 
responses than three-year-olds.  Four-year-olds did not perform differently from 
chance on the two functional questions, but they demonstrated a significant preference 
for the verbal expert on the labeling questions z = 2.00, p < .05, and for the causal 
expert on the causal questions, z = 2.16, p < .05.  Three-year-olds, however, did not 
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perform differently from chance on any of the prediction questions.   
 We also examined the responses for the eighteen children (M = 4.22, SD = .52) 
who correctly answered both of the judgment questions.  For the children who 
responded correctly to the judgment questions, age was not a significant predictor of 
their performance on the labeling, causal, or functional questions, though this may be 
due to the relatively low variance in age (Variance = .27).  Children who correctly 
responded to the judgment questions were significantly more likely to select the causal 
expert for the causal questions, (df, N = 18)  = 4.01, p < .04, and, at a marginal level 
of significance, were more likely to select the verbal expert for verbal questions, (df, 
N = 18)  = 2.79, p < .09.  These children were not significantly more likely to select 
the verbal expert for functional questions, (df, N = 18)  = 1.51, p < .22.   
 Regarding the functional prediction questions, we performed some further 
analyses concerning the consistency with which children selected one of the 
informants on both functional prediction trials.  Overall, the proportion of children 
who selected a single informant for both functional prediction trials was marginally 
significant, z = 1.26, p < .10.  This effect was amplified for four-year-olds, z = 5.92, p 
< .001, but was only marginally significant for three-year-olds, z = 1.30, p < .10. 
 
     Discussion 
 
 Children watched two events in which one of the informants demonstrated 
stronger verbal knowledge and the other demonstrated stronger causal knowledge.  
Most of the children, including the majority of three-year-olds and four-year-olds, 
correctly responded to the judgment questions, indicating that they were able to keep 
track of two basic histories of expertise.   
 While the majority of three-year-olds were able to accurately answer the 
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judgment questions, they did not use this information to guide their subsequent 
requests for assistance.  This result was expected and confirms the results of past 
research suggesting that three-year-olds have difficulty using information about other 
people's epistemic states to guide their requests for information (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 
2001).  It is also consistent with research indicating that three-year-olds have difficulty 
distinguishing the significance of knowledge domains (Lutz & Keil, 2002).  Thus, 
there is more than one known reason indicating why three-year-olds would have 
difficulty with this task.  Since the three-year-olds adequately encoded and recalled the 
events of the demonstration, it seems unlikely that the difficulty concerns information 
processing.   
 Identifying ways in which three-year-olds are able to use information they 
encode about epistemic states may help specify which aspect(s) of the process inhibits 
their performance.  For instance, rather than assessing three-year-olds' predictions 
about epistemic states, investigating their explanations from a post hoc viewpoint may 
provide additional information.  Indeed, prior research has indicated that it is often 
easier children for three-year-olds to provide explanations than predictions (Wellman, 
in press).  Additionally, asking three-year-olds for explanations about why they select 
specific informants can provide more information about their decisions and 
comprehension of epistemic states.  In sum, delineating the performance transition that 
children generally undergo from three to four in evaluating people's epistemic states 
remains a central issue for source monitoring research.   
 The performance of four-year-olds differed markedly from that of three-year-
olds.  With a relatively small amount of evidence, four-year-olds appropriately guided 
their requests for assistance, preferring the verbal expert for verbal knowledge and the 
causal expert for causal knowledge.  Four-year-olds encoded the relevant evidence of 
knowledge domains from observation, identified the domain of knowledge implicated 
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by the questions, and correctly matched the questions with the appropriate informant.  
Overall, children differentially preferred the verbal expert and the causal expert 
depending on the type of assistance needed.  Therefore, these results offer firm 
evidence indicating that four-year-olds can use information about knowledge domains 
to evaluate people as sources of knowledge.   
This research represents an important extension of previous research 
concerning children's understanding and use of domains of knowledge.  These results 
record an incipient ability to appreciate the significance of different types of 
knowledge.  Although it may be argued that the two knowledge domains used in this 
experiment, verbal knowledge and causal knowledge, are simpler than those used in 
past research, both lack common, conventional labels.  In this respect, it may be more 
difficult to recognize causal and verbal experts as opposed to familiar experts, such as 
doctors and pilots.  Moreover, as was discussed, previous research established that 
when given a label suggestive of a domain of knowledge, such as doctor, four-and-
five-year-olds identified concepts related to their expertise.  In this case, however, 
children were not provided with a label for the informants.  Rather, children were 
obligated to discern the relevance of the informants’ actions, thereby inducing an 
epistemic state from observable evidence.  Four-year-olds therefore demonstrated a 
greater level of sensitivity to the relevance and importance of knowledge domains in 
this study than in previous research.     
 Although four-year-olds responded consistently as a group to the verbal and 
causal questions, this consistency was not found for the functional questions.  Two 
possible theoretical perspectives presented different predictions regarding whether 
children would relate functional knowledge more closely to verbal knowledge or 
causal knowledge.  The first perspective proposed that children may prefer the verbal 
expert for functional questions, since both verbal and functional knowledge are types 
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of conventional knowledge.  Contrarily, given the relation of functions to objects' 
causal structures, the second perspective suggested that for this reason children may 
prefer the causal expert.  With a forced choice between a causal expert and a verbal 
expert, children of both ages performed no different from chance, seemingly 
undecided as to the best option.  While this result does not offer a clear resolution as to 
how children relate functional knowledge to verbal and causal knowledge, a trend was 
found in the consistency with which children selected one of the informants for both 
functional questions.  Three-year-olds selected the same informant for both questions 
at a marginally significant level, but four-year-olds did so at a much stronger level of 
significance.  This difference is an indication that four-year-olds approached the 
functional questions in a different manner than the three-year-olds.   Though they were 
not consistently making the same decision as a group, four-year-olds had firm answers 
to the functional questions.  This result may reflect theories that the older children 
developed regarding which expert is best suited to answer the functional questions.   
 Regarding children's conceptions of functional knowledge, future research 
should explore possible developmental trends in how children's own knowledge of 
functions relates to their preferences in source monitoring research.  Prior research has 
established that two-year-olds categorize objects based on their functions, suggesting 
that they consider functional knowledge to be of particular importance to the concepts 
of objects (Kemler, Russell, Duke, & Jones, 2000).  Thus, at two years of age, children 
understand that functional knowledge underlies verbal knowledge in the identification 
of objects.  At three and four years of age, as children explore the causal structures of 
objects through play and experimentation, they make a conceptually more prominent 
link; namely, that causal structures underlie functions (Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007).  As 
regards source monitoring research, children's preferences for the causal expert or 
verbal expert for the functional question may correspond with their understanding of 
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the relation between causal structure and objects' functional outputs.  Specifically, 
children may reference their own learning and knowledge to evaluate the suitability of 
the possible sources of knowledge.  Therefore, future research should further explore 
how children's own knowledge of the relation between causal structures and functions, 
and, in turn, functions and labels, may relate to their preferences for either the verbal 
expert or the causal expert.   
 Lastly, it has been suggested that children's performance in this experiment 
reflected evaluations of the epistemic states of the two informants.  Countering this 
perspective, it may be argued that children merely associated the informants with 
particular achievements, such as fixing the toys, but did not consider their mental 
states when responding to the prediction questions.  While this is a possibility, we 
argue that children were using their own knowledge about words and mechanics to 
judge the epistemic states of the informants.  In this study, there was no 
correspondence between the stimuli used in the demonstrations and the prediction 
trials.  Thus, children could not have associated the informants with particular types of 
objects.  Additionally, if children did not themselves distinguish between causal and 
verbal knowledge, it is difficult to conceive of why they would differentially prefer the 
verbal expert and causal expert when asked to choose a helper. 
 In conclusion, children consider a variety of information when evaluating 
whether to trust other people's statements.  This research provides further evidence 
that children recognize particular kinds of expertise, in this case causal expertise and 
verbal expertise, when deciding whom to ask for help.  While past research has 
focused on whether someone is accurate or inaccurate, these results emphasize that 
children pay attention to a more detailed piece of the puzzle.  Generally, people are 
neither categorically accurate nor inaccurate.  So one must consider what people are 
accurate and inaccurate about, and young children do.  
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     APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph #1: The hand-held 20 Questions game that Squirrel and Monkey fixed 
with a wrench. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph #2: The HSM microphone that Squirrel and Monkey fixed with a 
screwdriver.  
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Photograph #3: The tea diffuser used for one of the labeling questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph #4: The avocado peeler used for one of the labeling questions. 
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Photograph #5: One of the hand-held electronic toys used for one of the causal 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph #6: One of the hand-held toys used for one of the causal questions. 
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Photograph #7: The unconventional dish scrubber used for one of the functional 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph #8: The black electronic box used for the functional questions.  
 
 
 
 
21 
 
     REFERENCES 
 
 
Birch, S. A. J., Vauthier, S. A., & Bloom, P. (2008). Three- and four-year olds 
spontaneously use others' past performance to guide their learning. Cognition, 
107, 1018-1034. 
 
Clément, F., Koenig, M., & Harris, P. L. (2004). The ontogenesis of trust. Mind and 
Language, 19, 360 – 379. 
 
Gelman, S. A., & Gottfried, G. M. (1996). Children’s causal explanations for animate 
and inanimate motion. Child Development, 67, 1970-1987.  
 
Gelman, S. A., & Wellman, H. M. (1991). Insides and essences: Early understanding 
of the non-obvious. Cognition, 38, 213-244.  
 
Gopnik, A. & Astington, J. (1988). Children's understanding of representational 
change and its relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-
reality distinction. Child Development, 59(1), 26-37.  
 
Jaswal, V. K., & Neely, L. A. (2006). Adults don't always know best: Preschoolers use 
 past reliability over age when learning new words. Psychological  Science, 17 
 (9), 757-758. 
 
Kemler Nelson, D. G., Russell, R., Duke, N., & Jones, K. (2000). Two-year-olds will 
 name artifacts by their functions. Child Development, 71, 1271-1288.  
 
Koenig, M., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Preschoolers mistrust Ignorant and Inaccurate 
Speakers. Child Development, 76 (6), 1261 – 1277. 
 
Koenig, M. A., & Echols, C. H. (2003). Infants’ understanding of false labeling 
 events: The referential roles of words and the speakers who use them. 
 Cognition, 87,179 – 208. 
 
Kushnir, T., Wellman, H. M. & Gelman, S. A.(2008).  The role of preschoolers? 
Social understanding in evaluating the informativeness of causal interventions. 
Cognition, 108, 1084-1092. 
 
Liebal, K. & Tomasello, M. (2009). Infants appreciate the social intention behind a 
pointing gesture: Commentary on 'Children's understanding of communicative 
intentions in the middle of the second year of life' by T. Aureli, P. Perucchini 
and M. Genco. Cognitive Development, 24, 13-15.  
 
Lutz, D., & Keil, F. (2002). Early understanding of the division of cognitive labor. 
Child Development, 73,1073–1084. 
Moses, L., & Flavell, J. (1990). Inferring false beliefs from actions and reactions. 
22 
 
Child Development, 61, 929 – 945. 
 
Robinson, E. J., Mitchell, P., & Nye, R. (1995). Young children’s treating of 
utterances as unreliable sources of knowledge. Journal of Child Language, 22, 
663 – 685. 
 
Sabbagh, M. A., & Baldwin, D. A. (2001). Learning words from knowledgeable 
versus ignorant speakers: Links between preschooler's theory of mind and 
semantic development. Child Development, 72 (4), 1054-1070. 
 
Saint-Exupéry, A. de. (1946/1999). The Little Prince.  Gallimard: Évreux, France. 
 
Schulz, L., & Bonawitz, E. (2007). Serious fun: Preschoolers engage in more 
exploratory play when evidence is confounded. Developmental Psychology, 
43(4), 1045-1050.  
 
Sobel, D. & Corriveau, K.H. (in press). Children monitor people's expertise for word 
learning. Child Development.  
 
Sobel, Yoachim, Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Blumenthal (2007). The Blicket Within: 
Preschoolers' Inferences About Insides and Causes. Journal of Cognition and 
Development, 8(2), 159-182. 
 
Taylor, M., Cartwright, B. S., & Bowden, T. (1991). Perspective taking and theory of 
mind: Do children predict interpretive diversity as a  function of differences in 
observers’ knowledge? Child Development, 62, 1334 – 1351. 
 
Tomasello, M. & Rakoczy, (2007). What makes human cognition unique? From 
individual to shared to collective intentionality. Intellectica, 46-47(2-3), pp. 25-
48.  
 
Wellman, H., (in press).  Reinvigorating explanations for the study of early cognitive 
development.  Child Development Perspectives. 
